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The complexity of approximate Nash equilibrium
in congestion games with negative delays∗
Fre´de´ric Magniez† Michel de Rougemont‡ Miklos Santha§ Xavier Zeitoun¶
Abstract
We extend the study of the complexity of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in congestion
games from the case of positive delay functions to delays of arbitrary sign. We first prove that in
symmetric games with α-bounded jump the ε-Nash dynamic converges in polynomial time when all
delay functions are negative, similarly to the case of positive delays. We then establish a hardness result
for symmetric games with α-bounded jump and with arbitrary delay functions: in that case finding an
ε-Nash equilibrium becomes PLS-complete.
1 Introduction
Congestion games were introduced by Rosenthal [17] to model shared resources by selfish players. In these
games the strategies of each player correspond to some collection of subsets of a given set of common
resources. The cost of a strategy is the sum of the costs of the selected resources, where the cost of a
particular resource depends on the number of players having chosen this resource. This dependence is
described in the specification of the game by a non-decreasing delay function for each resource.
Congestion games can describe several interesting routing and resource allocation scenarios in networks.
More importantly from a game theoretic perspective, they have some particularly attractive properties.
Rosenthal has proven that they belong to the class of potential games where, for each player, an improvement
(decrease) in his cost is reflected by an improvement in a global function, the potential function. This implies,
in particular, that congestion games always have a pure Nash equilibrium. More precisely, a Nash equilibrium
can be reached by the so called Nash dynamics, in which an unsatisfied player switches his strategy to a
better one, which decreases his cost function. Since the same improvement is mirrored in the potential
function, which can not be decreased infinitely, this process indeed has to converge to an equilibrium in
a finite number of steps. In an exact potential game the changes in the individual cost functions and the
potential function are not only identical in sign, but also in the exact value. Monderer and Shapley [15] have
proved that congestion games and exact potential games are equivalent.
The existence of a potential function for congestion games allows us to cast searching for a Nash equi-
librium as a local search problem. The states, that is the strategy profiles of the players, are the feasible
solutions, and the neighborhood of a state consists of all authorized changes in the strategy of a single player.
Then local optima correspond to states where no player can improve individually his cost, that is exactly to
Nash equilibria. The potential of a state can be evaluated in polynomial time, and similarly a neighboring
state of lower potential can be exhibited, provided that there exists one. This means that the problem of
finding a Nash equilibrium in a congestion game belongs to the complexity class PLS, Polynomial Local
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Search, defined in [11, 16]. The class PLS is a subclass of TFNP [14], the family of NP search problems for
which a solution is guaranteed to exist. While PLS is not harder than NP ∩ coNP, it is widely believed to
be computationally intractable. It contains several complete problems, such as the weighted 2SAT-FLIP,
where one looks for a truth assignment that maximizes the sum of the weights of satisfied clauses among all
assignments of Hamming distance one. Fabrikant, Papadimitriou and Talwar [9] have shown that finding a
Nash equilibrium in congestion games is also PLS-complete. In addition, they have explicitly constructed
games in which the Nash dynamics takes exponential time to converge. It is worth to note that it is also
highly unlikely that computing a mixed Nash equilibrium in general games is feasible in polynomial time,
even when the number of players is restricted to two [8, 3].
It is therefore natural to look for relaxed versions, and in particular approximations, of Nash equilibria
which might be computed in polynomial time. Approximate Nash equilibria of various games have been
defined and studied both in the additive [12, 13, 4, 6, 7, 10, 19] and in the multiplicative models of approx-
imation [5, 2]. Here we consider multiplicative ε-approximate Nash equilibria, for 0 < ε < 1, that is states
where no single player can improve his cost by more than a factor of ε by unilaterally changing his strategy.
In this context, the analogous concept of the Nash dynamics is the ε-Nash dynamics, where only ε-moves
are permitted, which improve the respective player’s cost at least by a factor of ε. Rosenthal’s potential
function arguments implies again that the ε-Nash dynamics converges to an ε-Nash equilibrium.
In a very interesting positive result, Chien and Sinclair [5] proved that in congestion games with three
specific constraints the ε-Nash dynamics indeed does converge fast, in polynomial time. The three constraints
are positivity, symmetry, and α-bounded jump. The first two constraints are rather standard. A congestion
game is positive if all delay functions are non-negative, and it is symmetric if all players have the same
strategies. The third constraint puts a limit on the speed of growth of the delay functions. They define a
positive congestion game to be with α-bounded jump, for some α ≥ 1, if the delay functions can not grow
more than a factor α when their argument is increased by one. Their result states that in positive and
symmetric congestion games with α-bounded jump, the ε-Nash dynamics converges in polynomial time in
the input length, α and 1/ε.
Could it be that the ε-Nash dynamic converges fast in every congestion game? Skopalik and Vo¨cking have
found a very strong evidence for the contrary. In a negative result [18], they proved that for every polynomial
time computable 0 < ε < 1, finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, that is just as hard
as finding a Nash equilibrium. In fact, they result is even stronger, it shows the PLS-completeness of the
problem for positive games.
In this paper we extend these studies to the case when the delays can be also negative, that is some
resources might have the special status of improving the cost of the players when they are chosen. We
first prove that in symmetric games with α-bounded jump, when all delay functions are negative, the ε-Nash
dynamic converges in polynomial time, just as in the case of positive games. We then prove a hardness result:
finding an ε-Nash equilibrium in symmetric games with α-bounded jump becomes PLS-complete when delay
functions of arbitrary sign are allowed. In fact, our result is somewhat stronger: the PLS-completeness holds
even when all delay functions are of constant sign or when all the delays are of constant absolute value.
2 Preliminaries and results
2.1 Context
We recall the notions of congestion games, local search problems and approximate Nash equilibrium.
2.1.1 Congestion games
For a natural number n, we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}. For an integer n ≥ 2, an n-player game in
normal form is specified by a set of (pure) strategies Si, and a cost function ci : S → Z, for each player
i ∈ [n], where S = S1× · · · ×Sn is the set of states. For s ∈ S, the value ci(s) is the cost of player i for state
s. A game is symmetric if S1 = . . . = Sn.
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For a state s = (s1, . . . , , sn) ∈ S, and for a pure strategy ti ∈ Si, we let (s−i, t) to be the state
(s1, . . . , si−1, t, si+1, . . . , sn) ∈ S. A pure Nash equilibrium is a state s such that for all i, and for all pure
strategies t ∈ Si, we have
ci(s) ≤ ci(s−i, t).
In general games do not necessarily have a pure Nash-equilibrium.
A specific class of games which always have a pure Nash equilibrium are congestion games, where the
cost functions are determined by the shared use of resources. More precisely, an n-player congestion game is
a 4-tuple G = (n,E, (de)e∈E , (Si)i∈[n]), where E is a finite set of edges (the common resources), de : [n]→ Z
is a non-decreasing delay function, for every e ∈ E, and Si ⊆ 2
E is the set of pure strategies of player i, for
i ∈ [n]. Given a state s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn), let the congestion of e in s be fe(s) = |{i ∈ [n] : e ∈ si}|.
The cost function of user i is defined then as ci(s) =
∑
e∈si
de(fe(s)). Intuitively, each player uses some
set of resources, and the cost of each resource e depends on the number of players using it, as described
by the delay function. To simplify the notation, we will specify a symmetric congestion game by a 4-tuple
G = (n,E, (de)e∈E , Z), where by definition the set of pure strategies of every player is Z ⊆ 2
E. We will refer
to Z as the set of available strategies.
That congestion games have indeed a Nash equilibrium can be easily shown by a potential function
argument, due to Rosenthal [17], as follows. Let us define the potential function φ on the set of states as
φ(s) =
∑
e∈E
fe(s)∑
t=1
de(t).
If s = (s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn) and s
′ = (s−i, s
′
i) are two states differing only for player i then φ(s) − φ(s
′) =
ci(s) − ci(s
′) since both of these quantities are in fact equal to
∑
e∈si\s′i
de(fe(s)) −
∑
e∈s′
i
\si
de(fe(s
′)).
Therefore, in any state which is not a pure Nash equilibrium, there is always a player that can change
unilaterally his strategy so that the induced new state has smaller potential. In fact the decrease in the cost
function and in the potential are identical. This means that a finite sequence of such individual changes, the
so-called Nash dynamics, necessarily results in a pure Nash equilibrium since the integer valued potential
function can not decrease forever. Therefore congestion games can be casted as local search problems, and
the finding of a Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as the search of a local optimum.
2.1.2 Local search problems
A local search problem is defined by a 4-tuple Π = (I, F, (vI)I∈I , (NI)I∈I), where I the set of instances, F
maps every instance I ∈ I to a finite set of feasible solutions F (I), the objective function vI : F (I) → Z
gives the value vI(S) of a feasible solution, and NI(S) ⊆ F (I) is the neighborhood of S ∈ F (I). Given an
instance I, the goal is to find a feasible solution S ∈ F (I) such that is also local minimum, that is for all
S′ ∈ NI(S), it satisfies vI(S) ≤ vI(S
′). A local search problem is in the class PLS [11, 16] if there exist
polynomial algorithms in the instance length to compute: an initial solution S0; the membership in F (I); the
objective value vI(S); and a feasible solution S
′ ∈ NI(S) such that vI(S
′) < vI(S) whenever S is not a local
minimum. Computing a Nash equilibrium of congestion games is then indeed in PLS: Given an instance
G, the feasible solutions F (G) are the states S, the value vG(s) of a state s is its potential φ(s), and the
neighborhood NG(s) consists of those states which differ in one coordinate from s.
The notion of PLS-reducibility was introduced in [11]. A problem Π = (I, F, (vI )I∈I , (NI)I∈I) is PLS-
reducible to Π′ = (I ′, F ′, (v′I)I∈I′ , (N
′
I)I∈I′) if there exist polynomial time computable functions f : I → I
′
and gI : F (f(I))→ F (I), for I ∈ I, such that if S
′ is a local optimum of f(I) then gI(S
′) is local optimum of
I. Complete problems in PLS are not believed to be solvable by efficient procedures. Therefore, it is highly
unlikely that there exists at all a polynomial time algorithm for finding a pure equilibrium in congestion
games. Indeed, Fabrikant, Papadimitriou and Talwar [9] have shown that this problem is PLS-complete,
even for symmetric games.
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2.1.3 Approximate Nash equilibirum
Several relaxations of the notion of equilibrium have been considered in the form of approximations. Let
0 < ε < 1. In our context ε will be a constant or some polynomial time computable function in the input
length. A multiplicative ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is a state s such that for all i ∈ [n], and for all
strategies t ∈ Si, we have
ci(s)− ci(s−i, t) ≤ ε|ci(s)|.
Given a state s and a strategy t ∈ Si, we say that (s−i, t) is an ε-move for player i if
ci(s)− ci(s−i, t) > ε|ci(s)|.
Clearly s is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium if no player has an ε-move.
The ε-Nash dynamics is defined as a sequence of ε-moves, where a player with the largest absolute
gain makes the change in his strategy, when several players with ε-move are available. Analogously to the
exact case, the ε-Nash dynamics converges to an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium. Finding an ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium is also a problem in PLS. When casting this as a local search, the only difference with the
exact equilibrium case is that the neighborhoods are restricted to states which are reachable by an ε-move.
2.2 Related results
In [5] Chien and Sinclair have considered the rate of convergence of the ε-Nash dynamics in symmetric
congestion games with two additional restrictions on the delay functions. We say that a delay function de
is positive if the delays de(t) are non-negative integers for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n. A congestion game is positive if
all delay functions are positive. Let α ≥ 1. A positive delay function is with α-bounded jump if the delays
satisfy de(t + 1) ≤ αde(t), for all t ≥ 1. We can think of α as being a constant, or a polynomial time
computable function in the input length of the game. Obviously, a positive delay function with α-bounded
jump can never take the value 0. A positive game is with α-bounded jump if all delay functions are with
α-bounded jump. Chien and Sinclair have shown that in symmetric positive games with bounded jump the
ε-Nash dynamics converges in polynomial time.
Theorem 1 (Chien and Sinclair [5]). For every α ≥ 1 and 0 < ε < 1, in n-player symmetric, positive conges-
tion games with α-bounded jump the ε-Nash dynamics converges from any initial state in O(nαε−1 log(nmD))
steps, where m = |E|, and D = max{de(n) : e ∈ E} is an upper bound on the delay functions.
The hope that the ε-Nash dynamics converges fast in generic congestion games was crushed by Skopalik
and Vo¨cking [18]. In a strongly negative result they proved that finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium
is PLS-complete, that is just as hard as finding a Nash equilibrium. In fact, they result is even stronger, it
shows the PLS-completeness of the problem also in positive games.
Theorem 2 (Skopalik and Vo¨cking [18]). For every polynomial time computable 0 < ε < 1, finding an
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in a positive congestion game is PLS-complete.
2.3 Our contributions
In this paper we study the complexity of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in congestion games
where the delay functions can also have negative values. Our reason to study negative delays is twofold.
Firstly, negative delays are motivated by real scenarios worth of investigations. They correspond to situations
where some edges are encouraged to be taken by an authority, for example for regulation purposes. Such
negative edges become incentives, whereas the positive edges carry the traditional penalties. Secondly, games
with delays of arbitrary sign seem to have a richer mathematical structure than games with only positive
delays. Indeed, we will show that in symmetric games with α-bounded jump, while finding an ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium is easy when delays can only be negative, just as in positive games, the problem becomes
significantly harder when they can be of arbitrary sign.
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We feel that the case of the negative delays is somewhat analogous to the case of edges with negative
weights in shortest paths problems. Negative weights behave in that context also as incentives, and the
structure of shortest path problems is more complex when negative weights are also allowed. For example,
Dijkstra’s algorithm for single source shortest paths works correctly only in the case of edges with positive
weight.
In Section 3 we deal with symmetric games with α-bounded jump, where all delay functions are negative.
In Theorem 3 we show that the ε-Nash dynamics converges in polynomial time in the input length, α and
1/ε. This result is analogous to the result of Chien and Sinclair [5], stated in Theorem 1, but its proof is
significantly harder. In positive games the proof essentially shows that while the equilibrium state is not
reached, one can always find a player whose cost is polynomially related to the potential, and who either
can make an ε-move himself, or whose cost can lower bound the gain of any player with an ε-move. In
negative games it is not always possible to find a player with such a high cost, because we can relate the cost
functions to the appropriate potential only when it is restricted to edges with non-trivial congestion. To deal
with the unaccounted edges, we show that we can find an edge whose initial delay is polynomially related
to the remaining part of the potential. We then make a somewhat subtle case analysis which considers also
strategies involving these edges.
In Section 4 we extend our investigation to symmetric games with α-bounded jump, and with arbitrary
delay functions. We show that in that case the problem of finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium
becomes PLS-complete. In fact, we can show this even with some specific restrictions on the delays. In
Theorem 5 we prove the hardness result when all delay functions are of constant sign, and in Theorem 6
when delays can change their sign, but remain of constant absolute value. For the PLS-reductions we use
the PLS-complete problem of Skoplik and Vo¨cking [18] stated in Theorem 2.
3 Negative games
We start now the study of finding ε-approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games where the delay
functions can take negative values. In this section we impose the restriction that the delay functions have
only negative values. We further suppose that the games are symmetric and α-bounded. We show in a result
analogous to Theorem 1 that for any polynomial time computable α and ε, the ε-Nash dynamics converges
in polynomial time.
We say that a delay function de is negative if the delays de(t) are negative integers for all 1 ≤ t ≤ n. A
congestion game is negative if all delay functions are negative. Let α ≥ 1. A negative delay function is with
α-bounded jump if the delays satisfy de(t+ 1) ≤ de(t)/α, for all t ≥ 1. A negative game is with α-bounded
jump if all delay functions are with α-bounded jump.
Theorem 3. For every α ≥ 1, in an n-player symmetric, negative congestion game with α-bounded jump
the Nash dynamics converges from any initial state in O((αn2 + nm)ε−1 log(nmD)) steps where m = |E|,
and D = max{−de(1) : e ∈ E} is an upper bound on magnitude of the delay functions.
Proof. We will suppose without loss of generality that every edge appears in some strategy, since other-
wise the edge can be discarded from E. We first define a positive potential function which will be ap-
propriate to measure the progress of the ε-Nash dynamics. Let ψ be defined over the states as ψ(s) =
−
∑
e∈E
∑n
t=fe(s)+1
de(t). The function ψ is clearly positive, and we claim that it is a potential function,
that is ψ(s) − ψ(s′) = ci(s) − ci(s
′) if the states s and s′ differ only in their ith coordinate. This follows
immediately from the fact that for every state s, we have ψ(s) = φ(s) − k, where φ(s) =
∑
e∈E
∑fe(s)
t=1 de(t)
is the Rosenthal potential function, and k is the constant −
∑
e∈E
∑n
t=1 de(t). Observe that ψ(s) is bounded
from above by nmD, for every state s.
For an arbitrary initial state s(0), let s(k) be the kth state of the ε-Nash dynamics process. We claim
that ψ(s(k+1)) ≤ ψ(s(k))(1 − ε/4(αn2 + nm)), for every k, which clearly implies the theorem. Suppose that
s(k) = s = (s1, . . . , sn) is not an ε-equilibrium, and let i be the player which can make the largest gain ε-move.
To prove our claim, we will show that there exists a strategy s′i for player i such that ci(s) − ci(s−i, s
′
i) ≥
5
ψ(s)ε/4(αn2+nm). Hence, an ε-move of the ε-Nash dynamics can only be better than strategy s′i for player
i.
The first idea is to try to prove, analogously to the case of positive games, that for some player j, the
opposite of its cost −cj(s) is a polynomial fraction of ψ(s). Unfortunately this is not necessarily true. The
sum
∑n
j=1 cj(s) is not necessarily a polynomial fraction of ψ(s) because edges whose congestion is 0 in s
do not contribute to the former, but do contribute the latter. Therefore we introduce the function ψ′ as ψ
restricted to the edges with nontrivial congestion, that is by definition ψ′(s) = −
∑
fe(s) 6=0
∑n
t=fe(s)+1
de(t).
The following Lemma shows that some of the −cj(s) is at least a polynomial fraction of ψ
′(s).
Lemma 1. There exists a player j such that
−cj(s) ≥ ψ
′(s)/n2.
Proof. We claim that
−n
n∑
j=1
cj(s) ≥ ψ
′(s),
from which the statement clearly follows. To prove the claim we proceed by the following series of (in)equalities:
−n
n∑
j=1
cj(s) = −n
∑
fe(s) 6=0
fe(s) de(fe(s))
≥ −n
∑
fe(s) 6=0
de(fe(s))
≥ −
∑
fe(s) 6=0
n∑
t=fe(s)+1
de(t)
= ψ′(s),
where the second inequality holds because the delay functions are non-decreasing.
We fix a value j which satisfies Lemma 1 for the rest of the proof. To upper bound ψ(s), we also have to
consider the edges of congestion 0, besides the edges which are accounted for in ψ′(s). We have
ψ′(s)− n
∑
fe(s)=0
de(1) ≥ ψ(s),
again because the delays are non-decreasing. This implies that either ψ′(s) ≥ ψ(s)/2 or −n
∑
fe(s)=0
de(1) ≥
ψ(s)/2, and the proof proceeds by distinguishing these two cases.
Case 1: ψ′(s) ≥ ψ(s)/2. We then reason in two sub-cases by comparing the value of ci(s) to ψ
′(s)/2αn2.
If −ci(s) ≥ ψ
′(s)/2αn2, then let s′i be the strategy which makes the biggest gain for player i. Then we have
ci(s)− ci(s−i, s
′
i)) ≥ −εci(s)
≥ εψ(s)/4αn2,
where first inequality holds since the move of player i is an ε-move, and the second inequality is true because
of the hypotheses. If −ci(s) < ψ
′(s)/2αn2, then let s′i = sj , the strategy of player j in state s. Observe that
sj is an available strategy for player i since the game is symmetric. Then
ci(s)− ci(s−i, s
′
i)) ≥ ci(s)− cj(s)/α
≥ ψ′(s)/αn2 − ψ′(s)/2αn2
≥ ψ(s)/4αn2.
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Here the first inequality is true because the game is with α-bounded jump. The second inequality follows
from the hypothesis and because cj(s) ≥ ψ
′(s)/n2. Finally, the third inequality holds because ψ′(s) ≥ ψ(s)/2.
Case 2: −n
∑
fe(s)=0
de(1) ≥ ψ(s)/2. Then for some edge with fe(s) = 0, we have −de(1) ≥ ψ(s)/2nm.
Let’s fix such an edge e. We distinguish two sub-cases now by comparing the value of ci(s) to de(1)/2. If
ci(s) ≤ de(1)/2 then let s
′
i be the strategy which makes the biggest gain for player i. Then, similarly to the
first sub-case of Case 1, using the hypotheses and that player i’s move is an ε-move, we have
ci(s)− ci(s−i, s
′
i)) ≥ −εci(s)
≥ εψ(s)/4nm.
If ci(s) > de(1)/2 then let s
′
i be some strategy that contains the edge e. There exists such a strategy since
useless edges were discarded from E. Then fe(s−i, s
′
i)) = 1 since fe(s) = 0 and s and (s−i, s
′
i) differ only for
the ith player. This, in turn, implies that ci(s−i, s
′
i)) ≤ de(1), since the delays are negative. Therefore
ci(s)− ci(s−i, s
′
i)) ≥ ci(s)− de(1)
≥ −de(1)/2
≥ ψ(s)/4nm,
where the last two inequalities follow from the hypotheses.
4 Games without sign restriction
In this section we deal with congestion games with no restriction on the sign of the delay functions. Our
overall result is that in that case computing an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium is PLS-hard, even when the
two restrictions of Chien and Sinclair are kept, that is when the game is symmetric and with α-bounded
jump, for α ≥ 1. Observe that the smaller α the stronger is the hardness result, therefore we deal only
with constant α. Our first step is to observe that a simple consequence of Theorem 2 is that finding an
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in positive games remains PLS-complete even if we additionally suppose
that the game is symmetric. Our reductions will use the hardness of this latter problem. The proof of
this statement is a PLS-reduction of the search of an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in positive games to
the same problem in symmetric and positive games. This reduction is basically identical to the analogous
reduction for pure Nash equilibria, due to Fabrikant, Papdimitriou and Talwar [9]. We include here the proof
just for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 4. For every polynomial time computable 0 < ε < 1, finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium
in a symmetric and positive congestion game is PLS-complete.
Proof. Given a congestion game G with edge set E and strategy sets S1, . . . , Sn, we map it to the symmetric
game G′ defined as follows. The edge set of G′ is E ∪ {e1, . . . , en} where the ei’s are new edges. The set of
available common strategies is
⋃n
i=1 S
′
i where S
′
i = {s ∪ {ei} : s ∈ Si}. Set D =
∑
e∈E de(n). The delays of
the edges in E don’t change, and for every i ∈ [n], the delay of ei is defined as
dei(t) =
{
0 if t = 1,
D/(1− ε) if t ≥ 2.
Observe that D is an upper bound on the cost of the players in any state of G. Let s′ = (s′1, ..., s
′
n) be
an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in G′. For every i, there is necessarily a unique ji such that s
′
ji
∈ Si.
Indeed, if the strategies of several players would belong to the same Si then any of these players could pick
a strategy in which the congestion of the new edge would be 1, and therefore its cost would drop by at least
a factor of ε. It is then immediate that the state s = (s1, . . . , sn), where by definition si = s
′
ji
\ {ei}, is an
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in G.
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We need to discuss now the right notion of α-bounded jump when the jump occurs from a negative to a
positive value in the delay function. One possibility could be to require de(t+ 1) ≤ −αde(t) when de(t) < 0
and de(t + 1)) ≥ 0, but there are also other plausible definitions. In fact, we will avoid to give a general
definition because it turns out that this is not necessary for our hardness results. Indeed, we will be able
to establish a hardness result for congestion games where there is no jump at all around 0, that is for delay
functions of constant sign (still some of the delay functions can be negative while some others positive). We
say that a congestion game is non-alternating, if every delay function is positive or negative. Let α > 1
be a constant. A non-alternating congestion game is with α-bounded jump if all delay functions are with
α-bounded jump.
What happens when α = 1? We could also consider non-alternating games with 1-bounded jump, but
they are not interesting. These are games with constant delay functions for which a pure Nash equilibrium
can be determined trivially. Indeed, the cost functions of the individual players are independent from the
strategies of the other players, and therefore any choice of a least expensive strategy, for each player, forms
a Nash equilibrium. Nonetheless, if we authorize a jump around 0, then even if the jump changes only the
sign without changing the absolute value (which corresponds intuitively to the case α = 1 in that situation),
the game becomes already hard. We say that a delay function de is a flip function, if there exists a positive
integer c such that for some 1 ≤ k ≤ n, the function satisfies
de(t) =
{
−c if t < k,
c if t ≥ k.
Flip functions are either constant positive functions, or they are simple step functions, which are constant
negative up to some point, where an alternation occurs which keeps the absolute value. After the alternation
the function remains constant positive. A congestion game is a flip game if all delay functions are flip
functions. The next two theorems state our hardness results respectively for non-alternating games with
α-bounded jump and for flip games.
Theorem 5. For every constant α > 1, and for every polynomial time computable 0 < ε < 1, computing an
ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in n-player symmetric, non-alternating congestion games with α-bounded
jump is PLS-hard.
Proof. As stated in Theorem 4 finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in a symmetric and positive
congestion game is PLS-complete [18]. We present a PLS-reduction from this problem to the problem of
finding an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in a symmetric and non-alternating game with α-bounded jump.
Let G = (n,E, (de)e∈E , Z) a symmetric and positive congestion game, and let α > 1 be a constant. In
our reduction we map G to the symmetric game G′ = (n,E′, (de′)e′∈E′ , Z
′) that we define now. For each
e ∈ E, we set Ee = {e1, e
+
2 , e
−
2 , . . . , e
+
n , e
−
n }, and for every z ⊆ E, we define z
′ =
⋃
e∈z Ee (and therefore
E′ =
⋃
e∈E Ee). The set of available strategies is defined as Z
′ = {z′ : z ∈ Z}. Finally the delay functions
are defined as follows. The delay de1 is simply the constant function de(1). For k ≥ 2, we set
de+
k
(t) =
{
(de(k)− de(k − 1))
α
α2−1 if t < k,
(de(k)− de(k − 1))
α2
α2−1 if t ≥ k,
and
de−
k
(t) =
{
−(de(k)− de(k − 1))
α
α2−1 if t < k,
−(de(k)− de(k − 1))
1
α2−1 if t ≥ k.
The game G′ is clearly non-alternating and with α-bounded jump.
Observe that there is a bijection between the states of G and G′. Indeed, the states of G′ are of the
form s′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
n), where s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Z
n is a state of G. For the reduction we will simply show
that if s′ is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in G′ then s is an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium in G
(our construction satisfies also the reverse implication). In fact, we show a stronger statement about cost
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functions: for every state s, and for every player i, the cost of player i for s in G is the same as the cost of
player i for s′ in G′.
The edges e+k and e
−
k are such that the sum of their delay functions emulates the jump de(k)− de(k− 1)
when t ≥ k. Therefore the sum of the delays corresponding to edges in Ee is just de which is expressed in
the following lemma.
Lemma 2. For every edge e ∈ E, and for every 1 ≤ t ≤ n,∑
e′∈Ee
de′ (t) = de(t).
Proof. It is immediate from the definition that the delays satisfy for every 2 ≤ k ≤ n, and 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
de+
k
(t) + de−
k
(t) =
{
0 if t < k,
de(k)− de(k − 1) si t ≥ k.
Therefore
∑
e′∈Ee
de′(t) = de(1) +
t∑
k=2
(de+
k
(t) + de−
k
(t))
= de(1) +
t∑
k=2
(de(k)− de(k − 1))
= de(t).
We now claim the following strong relationship between the cost functions in the two games.
Lemma 3. For all state s = (s1, . . . , sn) in G, and for every player i, we have
ci(s
′) = ci(s),
where s′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
n).
Proof. It is easy to verify the following sequence of equalities:
ci(s
′) =
∑
e′∈s′
i
de′ (fe′(s
′))
=
∑
e∈si
∑
e′∈Ee
de′ (fe′(s
′))
=
∑
e∈si
∑
e′∈Ee
de′ (fe(s))
=
∑
e∈si
de(fe(s))
= ci(s).
Indeed the first and last equalities are just the definitions of the cost functions, and the second one is true by
the definition of s′i. The third equality holds because for every edge e ∈ E, every e
′ ∈ Ee, and every player
i, the strategy si contains e if and only if s
′ contains e′, and therefore fe′(s
′) = fe(s). The fourth eqality
follows from Lemma 2.
By Lemma 3 we can trivially deduce and ε-approximate Nash equilibrium for G, given an ε-approximate
Nash equilibrium for G′. This concludes the proof of the theorem.
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Theorem 6. For every polynomial time computable 0 < ε < 1, computing an ε-approximate Nash equilibrium
in n-player symmetric, flip congestion games is PLS-hard.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of the previous theorem. In the reduction the definition of the
game G′ is as in Theorem 5 except for the delay functions, for 2 ≤ k ≤ n, which are defined now as
de+
k
(t) =
{
(de(k)− de(k − 1))/2 if t < k,
(de(k)− de(k − 1))/2 if t ≥ k,
and
de−
k
(t) =
{
−(de(k)− de(k − 1))/2 if t < k,
(de(k)− de(k − 1))/2 if t ≥ k.
These are indeed flip functions, and it is easy to see that Lemma 2 holds again. This implies, similarly to
Theorem 5, that the reduction is correct.
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